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JUDGES AND FEDERALISM: A COMMENT ON
"JUSTICE KENNEDY'S VISION OF FEDERALISM"
Robert F. Nagel*
Professor Maltz makes the point that Justice Kennedy tends to take an
expansive view of states' rights when the issue involves control over state
institutions ("structural autonomy") but not when the issue involves control
over substantive policies ("decisional autonomy").' According to Maltz,
Kennedy is especially unsympathetic to states' rights when state decisional
autonomy is threatened by the federal judiciary. Professor Maltz ascribes
this inconsistency in Kennedy's views to a failure of understanding,
specifically Kennedy's failure to see the importance of decisional autonomy
to the principle of federalism. In this comment I expand on this explanation
by asking whether there is something about the role of a judge that interferes
with a robust understanding of the importance of decisional autonomy to
federalism. I suggest that Kennedy's failure of understanding is traceable to
attitudes towards authority that are probably inherent in judging. This
explanation seems to be consistent with an array of federalism cases,
including the recent jurisdictional cases described and analyzed in Professor
2
Wells' paper.
I should first briefly explain why I think it is worthwhile expanding on
Professor Maltz's criticism of Kennedy. One reason is that Maltz's depiction
of Kennedy's rather intermittent commitment to state sovereignty is accurate
and, if anything, understated. It was, for instance, the same Justice Kennedy
who in Alden v. Maine3 wrote that Congress must treat states as "joint
participants in the governance of the Nation" 4 who in U. S. Term Limits, Inc.
v. Thornton,5 not only joined and echoed the majority's stridently
nationalistic opinion but went even further by suggesting that states have no
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3. 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
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5. 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
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reserved power to regulate any exercise of national power. 6 Kennedy, that
is, revived the nationalistic excesses of Justice Marshall's rhetoric in
McCulloch v. Maryland,7 according to which today states would not have
the authority to make federal mail trucks brake for stop signs. 8
Moreover, Maltz's observation about the tension in Kennedy's views
about state autonomy is true, at least to some degree, of several other
Justices besides Kennedy. Think, for example, of Justice Scalia, whose
opinion in Printzv. UnitedStates9 protected states' executive functions from
federal commandeering, but whose opinion in R.A. V v. City of St. Paul10
constricted state authority over what had always been considered
unprotected speech and whose opinion in Texas v. Johnson11 struck down
flag desecration statutes in some forty-eight states. Or consider Justice
O'Connor, who, of course, initiated the recent revival of Tenth Amendment
structural protections with her opinion in New York v. United States.12 In
PlannedParenthood v. Casey,13 she joined Justices Kennedy and others in
an extraordinarily vehement denunciation of efforts by states to resist the
judicial monopolization of abortion policy announced in Roe v. Wade. 14
O'Connor also joined Justice Kennedy in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Commission 15 to vote to strike down bans on anonymous campaign
literature that had been enacted into law in forty-nine states. This last term
in Saenz v. Roe, 16 O'Connor joined with Kennedy and Scalia to displace
significant state policies on public welfare, going even further than that high
water mark of Warren Court policy-making, Shapiro v. Thompson. 17
So I think Professor Maltz is on to something, an important and at least
somewhat general phenomenon that does call for explanation. If, as Maltz
6. See id. at 841 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The states have no power, reserved or
otherwise, over the exercise of federal authority within its proper sphere.").
7. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
8. "The court has bestowed on this subject its most deliberate consideration. The result
is a conviction that the states have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede,
burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by
congress ...... Id. at 436. For a fuller discussion, see Robert F. Nagel, The Term Limits
Dissent: What Nerve, 38 ARIz. L. REV. 843, 847-52 (1996).
9. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
10. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
1I. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
12. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
13. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
14. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
15. 515 U.S. 334 (1995).
16. 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
17. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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charges, Kennedy (and, I would add, others on the court) do not understand
the importance of decisional autonomy to our federal system, what accounts
for this failure of understanding?
One hypothesis emerges from the term limits decision. In Thornton,
Kennedy joined a majority opinion that is, in my opinion, deeply hostile
to-I would even say oblivious of-an essential aspect of the idea of
federalism. The majority opinion suggests that state term limits would turn
the United States into a "confederation of nations." 18 Justice Kennedy
frames the issue as being whether "the sole political identity of an American
is with the State of his or her residence." 19 Furthermore, the majority asserts
repeatedly that representatives in the national government "owe primary
allegiance not to the people of a state, but to the people of the Nation." 20 In
short, the Thornton majority, including Justice Kennedy, writes as if there
were no middle ground between confederation and consolidation, as if the
mixed federal system of divided and limited loyalties2 1 contemplated by our
Constitution were in fact an alien and dangerous idea.
On the contrary, that it is possible and desirable to be loyal both to the
national and state governments at the same time is a distinctly American
to
idea. Indeed, the Constitution was enacted partly on the idea that loyalty
22
the states would discipline and define the nature of loyalty to the union. It
was often and emphatically urged, for example, that citizens in the states,
protective of their freedoms and their local institutions, would act-through
political organization and even armed resistance if necessary-to keep the
national government within the limits of its constitutional authority. 2 3 Statebased disagreement with national institutions, then, would constitute a form
of loyalty to the Nation.
There are some obvious reasons why this American idea of multiple,
partial loyalties might be especially incompatible with the judicial mind and
temperament. The essential task ofjudges, of course, is to resolve cases, and
to do this they need to find some controlling authority. An authority, it goes
without saying, will tend to seem controlling to the extent that it is definite,
unambiguous, and permanent. Accordingly, as is commonly noted, judges
are inclined to simplify complex historical evidence and to over-state the
18. 514 U.S. at 821.
19. Id. at 840 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
20. Id. at 803.
21. See Nagel, supra note 8, at 849-51.
22. See id. at 850 and sources cited therein.
23. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 17 (Alexander Hamilton), Nos. 44, 45 (James
Madison).
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degree of certainty with which a legal rule or principle resolves a case.2 4 For
exactly the same reasons it is to be expected that judges will deny, distort, or
undervalue constitutional principles that are characterized by openendedness, ambiguity, and other forms of messiness. This is to say that it is
to be expected that judges will be especially inclined not to appreciate or
understand those processes that depend upon various forms of political
disagreement, conflict, and defiance.
This judicial preference for singular and clear authority would explain,
among other things, the Thornton Court's otherwise weird insistence that it
would threaten our constitutional structure to elect representatives to
Congress who owed any loyalty except to the Nation. As my children say,
"Get real!" Or, as I say, only a judge could think that it was the Arkansas
terms limits statute that ushered in the possibility that states might elect
parochial representatives or, more importantly, that conflicted, partial
loyalties and perspectives are incompatible with our federal system.
Seen from this perspective, the difference between structural autonomy
and decisional autonomy is that structural autonomy involves less conflict
with national objectives because the only relevant national policy
determination relates to the state governments themselves. Notice that
structural autonomy still does not extend to nondiscriminatory federal
regulations that bind state governments along with citizens. In such
circumstances judicial protection of state autonomy would represent a
sharper conflict with national authority because states would be free to defy
an otherwise generally applicable federal policy. In these circumstances,
Congress is essentially free under Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority 25 to invade even the structural autonomy of the states. In
short, although the Court protects the structural autonomy of the states in
recognition that under our constitutional system states must continue to
exist, the Justices protect structural autonomy only when it represents the
minimum possible threat to the implicit judicial preference for a clear
ordering of authority over public policy.
Along similar lines, it is possible to generally construct a rough index of
when national authority is likely to be vindicated by the judiciary. National
authority is highest (and most likely to be protected from competitors)
where states defy or disagree with Supreme Court interpretations of the
Constitution because both the Court and the Constitution are almost pure
24. See, e.g., Roger M. Smith, The Inherent Deceptiveness of ConstitutionalDiscourse:
A Diagnosis and Prescription,in INTEGRrrY AND CONSCIENCE 218 (Ian Shapiro & Robert
Adams eds., 1998).
25. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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symbols of unified, definite national authority and because tolerating state
and local government challenges would fragment authority among
innumerable contestants. 2 6 This is demonstrated by Kennedy's participation
27
in the hysterically nationalistic opinion in Casey.
Next highest is where the national legislature (which, inevitably, is
contaminated with some degree of state influence and even state-based
loyalty) defies or disagrees with federal judicial interpretations of the
Constitution. This is illustrated by Kennedy's strong hostility, as expressed
in City of Boerne v. Flores,2 8 to congressional efforts to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment in ways that reverse precedent.
Somewhat lower on the scale is where state decisions conflict, not with
specific existing judicial interpretations of the Constitution, but with general
values arguably implicit in the Constitution. Here national authority is less
defined and therefore less clear-but still very strong according to the
judge's preference for singular authority, especially when challenged by
multiple decisionmakers. This is demonstrated by the many individual rights
cases and the dormant commerce clause cases in which, as Professor Maltz
points out, Kennedy voted to limit state decisional autonomy on the basis of
highly questionable interpretations of the Constitution. 29
Lower yet on the scale of national authority are situations where state
decisions conflict with congressional policies. Such policies, of course,
represent national authority and are often upheld, as is the case with most
commerce clause enactments, including those that regulate state
governments directly. 30 But here, national authority is seen as less powerful
because congressional policies are constitutionally discretionary and
because Congress is suspect due to the possibility of parochial influences.
Hence Kennedy can vote to overrule the Gun-Free School Zones law and to
protect local school districts from statutory claims of sexual harassment. 3 1
26. Even sophisticated commentators call this "anarchy." See Larry Alexander &
Frederick Schauer, On ExtrajudicialConstitutionalInterpretation, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1359,
1379 (1997).
27. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 843-901 (1992) (plurality
opinion).
28. 521 U.S. 507(1997).
29. See Maltz, supra note 1, at 765-70.
30. See Robert F. Nagel, The Future ofFederalism, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 643, 656
(1996).
31. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that Congress has no power
under the Commerce Clause to create gun-free school zones); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of
Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 653 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (1999) (holding that a private damages
action may exist against a school board for cases of student-on-student harassment).
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National authority in this category is even less implicated to the extent that
states are unlikely to favor substantive policies that oppose the congressional
policy. States, for example, are unlikely to favor either guns in schools or
sexual harassment, so whatever national authority is implicated by the
congressional policy is less undermined by judicial protection of state
32
decisional autonomy.
Next lower on the scale of national authority is when the national
congressional policy at issue relates specifically to state institutions and,
therefore, the authoritativeness of national regulatory policy is not
significantly diminished. This is demonstrated by cases like New York v.
34
United States33 and Printz v. United States.
At the very low end of the spectrum of national authority are instances
where the congressional policy would be enforced by lawsuits against the
states themselves, Professor Well's subject. In this area there is no necessary
reason to expect substantive disagreement between the national and state
governments. In any event, federal policies can be carried out through suits
naming state officials rather than the state. Hence, the Court has a longrunning willingness to enforce the Eleventh Amendment and now, in
35
Florida Prepaid Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, to
protect state immunity even from legislation enacted under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Professor Wells argues that Florida Prepaid
represents a misapplication of Flores3 6 and that it ignores the fact that
Congress is better than the Court at balancing how vigorously rights should
be enforced as against state values. 37 I would add that to allow enforcement
in federal courts only if state relief is demonstrably inadequate, which is
what FloridaPrepaiddoes, is to see reluctance or disagreement at the state
level as the only predicate for invoking federal jurisdiction. In short, the
sovereignty of state governments is protected by Florida Prepaid,but only
because there is no evidence of conflicting perspectives on appropriate
policy.

32. This suggests, by the way, that Kennedy might be inclined to vote against the
Violence Against Women Act, as states already penalize violent acts generally and any failure
to specify gender-violence can only in an attenuated way be seen as a challenge to national
policy.
33. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
34. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
35. 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999).
36. See Wells, supra note 2, at Part III.B.
37. Wells, supra note 2, at 790-91.
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In summary, my suggestion is that Justice Kennedy's sharply
differential assessment of structural autonomy and decisional autonomy is a
part of a much broader pattern. The fundamental impulse behind that pattern
is to vindicate national authority, and that impulse is at war with federalism
to the extent that federalism exists so that disagreement can be registered
and national authority questioned. Of course, the Justices do understand the
elementary and undeniable principle that states have constitutional status,
and a willingness to protect structural autonomy naturally flows from this
understanding. But for the Justices to appreciate fully why states exist would
be in tension with inherent aspects of the judicial function and with natural
inclinations of the judicial mind.

